The Doctor and the Charlatan by Stengers, Isabelle
Curing for the wrong reasons
We all know, in fact we are sure, that our medical practices are very different from those in
the times of Molière or of Louis XVI. In one way or another medicine has today become
‘modern’ in the same way as the whole set of knowledges and practices that call them-
selves rational. This is obvious, but I would like to interrogate this obviousness. Not to debunk
it so as to show that beyond these appearances nothing has changed, but in order to focus
in a slightly clearer way on ‘what’ has changed. To be even more precise, I would like to focus
on ‘what’ has changed for the doctor, the one who practises medicine.
Today’s accumulated knowledges about living organisms, plus the biochemical and meta-
bolic techniques of analysis and modes of visualisation and imaging, will all play a part in
what I want to do, but will not be my prime concern, because they relegate the doctor to the
role of communication relay between the individual patient and the body of general bio-
logical knowledge. Nor do I want to focus on the institutions, industries, administrative regu-
lations and financing channels that also contribute to the shaping of medical practices. In
short, I am not dealing with medicine in general, with its problems, its inertias, its ambi-
tions, its more or less vicious circles or its occasional uncontrollable waywardness. Nor is
there anything sociological about the question I am posing. I am not interested in knowing
‘who’ the doctor is, but rather ‘what’ it means, ever since medicine became modern, to be a
doctor, to be involved with a ‘suffering body’ and to be involved with it in the context of
a supposedly rational framework. In other words, what does it mean for the doctor to be
carrying out a rational practice?
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ISABELLE STENGERS
—
ISABELLE STENGERS—THE DOCTOR AND THE CHARLATAN 1122 VOLUME9 NUMBER2 NOV2003
theory is able to leap over. What this mode of description puts on stage is, first and foremost,
a set of correlations between two distinct modes of approach to psychic function, two modes
that are privileged by the sole fact that they are both accessible to observation.
Of course, nobody would deny that there ‘must’ be a relationship between the effect of a
drug and the modification of neurone transmission. But it is exactly this ‘there must be a
relationship’ which defined the practical field of empiricism: the research is dominated by
whether or not the observations are accessible, observations between which ‘there must be
a relationship’ and between which all sorts of correlations can in fact be established. But the
significance of what is observable as well as their correlations is open to an indeterminate
number of interpretations. No doubt we have increasingly powerful technical means to mea-
sure, and even to create, new possibilities of observation as far as the different aspects of
cerebral activity are concerned, but what we measure and observe does not have the power
to determine the correctness of what is, in that way, observed and measured.
Let’s go back to Deslon’s tub, where what was revealed was the power of experimental
method in the fight against the modern version of the charlatan, the one who makes him-
self the representative of a ‘cause’ claiming the power to bring about physiological trans-
formations in whatever circumstances. So what was going on around the Mesmerian tub?
The scene of the tub illustrates the asymmetrical nature of experimental method as far as
medicine is concerned. It allowed for elimination, for the destruction of pretensions, and
refutations, but it remained silent on the cures that were actually observed. No doubt
these were attributed to the ‘imagination’ of the patients. But imagination, as much as
‘faith healing’, is just a way of disqualifying the phenomenon rather than understanding it.
Incidentally, Deslon complained that the commissioners did not define what they meant by
this ‘imagination’, to which they attributed the power to cure.
It is interesting to note that among the commissioners the only one to criticise the judge-
ment of the commission, in a minority report, claiming no interest in Mesmerian practices,
was a naturalist, that is, a practitioner of empirical method: the great botanist Antoine Laurent
de Jussieu. Jussieu stressed that even if the commission successfully refuted an incorrect
idea, that did not mean they had a greater understanding of what was going on around
Deslon’s tub. Because the procedure of his majoritarian colleagues depended on a hypothesis
of simple causality, all they did was substitute a hypothetically ‘simple’ cause, imagination,
for another simple cause, fluid. In fact they had staged the phenomenon by defining it as the
site of a contest between two possible causes: either fluid or imagination. By why not
imagine multiple causality, where ‘moral’ causes (whence ‘imagination’) would interfere with
‘physical’ causes (the ‘touchings’ that magnetisers performed and that Jussieu himself had
occasion to test the effectiveness of). If the two types of causes could have, in certain cir-
cumstances, the same type of effect, the protocols for the commissioners’ inquiry would lose
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An initial problem is this: ever since what we call the modern sciences began, each know-
ledge and practice aspiring to rationality has had to be positioned in relation to them.
Now, from the point of view of the rhetorical and/or practical strategies used for this rational
purpose, the doctor presents a particular case, and for at least three reasons.
First, there is a practice that could be called immemorial: in all civilisations, among all
human groups, in all cultures, there exists and has existed specially designated curers, as
well as therapeutic knowledges transmitted from generation to generation.
Second, the desire to define medicine as a rational practice is, from a historical point of
view, fairly independent from the production of a set of practices we deem rational, in the
sense of improving in a systematic fashion the likelihood for the patient to be cured. In other
words, there is no ‘Galileo’ of medicine who created simultaneously a discourse and a
practice that made a distinct break from the past and was recognisable as the beginning of
‘the history of modern medicine’. One might be tempted to slot Louis Pasteur or Robert Koch
into this role, but they emerged far too late, at a time when everyone thought that modern
medicine was already well under way.
Third, as a profession authorised by a diploma, and the product of teaching organised by
doctors themselves, medicine precedes the appearance of the modern sciences by a long way.
In Europe, medicine was taught in the medieval university, and even at that time it was locked
in a struggle, which continues to this day, pitting degree-bearing doctors against various tra-
ditional types of ‘healer’. This idea of regulating the right to care for patients is a continual
feature of the history of Western medicine. So at what point does one move from a notion
of corporate rights—designating medicine as a profession defending its monopoly—to a
principle that can effectively embrace the logic of rationality? What principle could invoke
the ‘real’ difference between the practices of modern doctors and those of charlatans? Each
case can be examined on its merits, and even today the difference is not always very clear.
Nevertheless, I would like to begin with the question of the ‘charlatan’ to develop my enquiry
into so-called modern medicine. More precisely, I will start with the transformation of the
mode of denunciation that creates the object ‘charlatan’, and with the transformation of
the charlatan’s identity.
This approach first of all relates to the fact that in medicine the theme of rationality has
a polemical accent that is not in evidence anywhere else. Of course, there is a polemical angle
to the way chemistry is distinguished from alchemy, astronomy from astrology and Darwinian
biology from the ‘static’ doctrine of the species. But in each of these cases the polemic is part
of the foundation narrative, or part of the edifying pedagogy. Astrology is not stalking astro-
nomy, and the latter does not feel in the slightest danger of being confused with this ‘other’,
which in any case it has scarcely ever encountered. There is no procedure in the repertoire
of the astronomer that is designed to establish a distinction with the knowledge of the
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is a recognisable style to the story, which can, a posteriori, set the scene for this extension.
A posteriori, what is recounted and transmitted in scientific manuals resembles what the
philosopher Immanuel Kant characterised as the effects of the ‘Copernican revolution’, which
allows a scientific field to depart from empirical practice. For Kant, this so-called ‘Coper-
nican revolution’ translates the fact that the scientist no longer learns from the phenomenon,
but imposes his own questions on it. This means that the scientist imposes a point of view
on the phenomenon and this allows him to predict a priori which questions are relevant
and which adjustments will bring to light the dominant causal relationships organising all
the others.
This is certainly the story one can tell about the extension of Galilean mechanics, but not
about the kind of medicine derived from Pasteur and Koch. We know now that the question
left hanging by Pasteur (that of the epidemic ‘field’ from the point of view of the infected
organism’s reactions) opened a real Pandora’s box, and that there is now no story that can, a
posteriori, give it a ‘Copernican’ spin. To the question ‘why does one fall sick?’, the immune
system, a network where many interdependent causalities are operating, offers no simple
answer. Certainly there has been progress both in terms of knowledge and modes of treat-
ment, but this progress is a long way from keeping pace with a mode of explanation that is
becoming more economical, more powerful, and capable of always establishing more stable
distinctions among what is cause, what is consequence and what is of no importance at all.
The definition of sickness that begins with the micro-organism has not had the power to
rank things and become the Royal Road towards the definition of sickness from the point of
view of the patient. It has been the entry point into a labyrinth of subtle questions, the ins
and outs of which biologists and doctors must explore, now and in the future, in order to
learn from the living body what it is capable of doing.
Pasteur and Koch thought they had discovered the perspective determining the landscape
of causal or functional relationships that define epidemic illness. I maintain that, no matter
how sophisticated its technical instrumentation has become, epidemiology is today defined
by a form of empiricism: by the necessity to test, observe and describe, in short, to learn from
the phenomenon without having the power of deciding a priori what questions to ask it. I
stress this point because often the highly technical character of biomedical description is
deceptive. How, for example, when we talk of the chemistry of the brain, can we dare speak
of empiricism while we have, on an ongoing basis, more and more precise pictures con-
veying metabolic intensities of different cerebral regions, and while we can identify speci-
fic neuronal sites and their corresponding neurotransmitters? Still, one speaks comfort-
ably, even in this case, of fundamentally empirical research. In fact, between the richness
of the psychic effects of a drug, for example, and the hypothesis that states that the drug is
modifying the effects of a class of neurotransmitters, there is a gulf that no contemporary
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and Koch were able to isolate germs as the specific causes of specific sicknesses. They were
thus able to ‘make them speak’, to make them perform in such a way that they became
reliable witnesses of their own power to cause a sickness and to become its medium for trans-
mission. In a correlative manner, Koch’s postulations were able to justify a theory of infec-
tious disease, in other words a way of thinking about disease from a more economic, that is,
more powerful, standpoint than a mere empirical description. These postulates make
medicine capable of anticipating and ranking problems, with the summit being the identi-
fication of the germ and the establishment of its role.
The examples of Pasteur and Koch show, do they not, that experimentation is the Royal
Road of medicine? The need to have recourse to proof via comparison with a placebo seems
to signify, quite simply, that we do ‘not yet’ have available to us this Royal Road as far as
the whole set of our illnesses are concerned. The expression ‘rational pharmacology’ is a
translation for this kind of hope. One day, the curing power of a chemical substance will
be able to be deduced from a theoretico-experimental knowledge of the human body, and it
is to this knowledge that the substance will owe its status of medicine. For each affliction,
one will be able to deduce the appropriate type of action, the structure of the molecule
that has the power to heal, and it will become less and less necessary to ask if effectiveness
alone will be sufficient to warrant the patient’s trust. On the other hand, the stubborn
character of the charlatan, this artist who works the relationships between the susceptibility
of the suffering body and ‘irrational’ influences, will finally meet its match, something capable
of immediately disqualification, since medicine will have the power to act on the ‘real
causes’ of the problem. Both the placebo effect and the charlatan will have a clear part to play
in the perspective of a future theoretico-experimental medicine. They must disappear: the
placebo because it is the bearer of the basic empirical character of pharmacological research,
and the charlatan because, to the extent that medicine increases its effectiveness, he will lose,
for his part, his power of parasitical seduction.
And yet, the precedent set by Pasteur’s scientific triumph does not constitute either a prom-
ise of or a first step towards this luminous future. This brings me back to question of the
‘field’, which Pasteur opened up in regard to micro-organisms. As far as a micro-organism is
concerned, it makes no difference whether it is in a test tube or a living body. This indiffer-
ence allows the biologist to characterise this position: what environment allows the organ-
ism in question to reproduce itself, and what one diminishes its virulence? Of course, with
immunology, biology and medicine have, ever since Pasteur, contributed massively to the
understanding of the field from the point of view of the contaminated organism itself. But
this is exactly where any resemblance to the theoretico-experimental sciences disappears.
There is nothing simple or spontaneous about the way in which the theoretico-experimental
sciences extend their field of inquiry and the relevance of their practices.5 Nevertheless, there
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astrologer. In this case the polemic is symbolic but it creates
no constraint or problem. In the case of medicine, however—
and I am thinking here of so-called ‘soft’ medicines—the idea
of charlatanism is quite central, as it is continually brought to public attention and debated
over and over again in the press and in public institutions. So in an implicit way charlatanism
organises, as we shall see, medical and pharmaceutical research.
This choice of approach also gives us the entertaining option of identifying a ‘first act’,
that is, both a particular moment and a multifaceted episode, where we can assemble a cast,
and identify and make perform all the significant factors and dilemmas I am going to use for
the purposes of recognising modern medicine.
The scene takes place in Paris in 1784. Two commissions have been appointed to investi-
gate the practices of the Viennese doctor Franz Anton Mesmer. Their main task is to put the
principles underlying his practices to the test. According to Mesmer’s practice, his patients
gather around a tub that contains a magnetic fluid, which has the power to effect the cures
on which his reputation is based. We know that Mesmerian fluid is not part of the present-
day therapeutic arsenal, and that therefore it did not survive the enquiry. Nonetheless, we
must acknowledge that at the time Mesmer’s ‘animal magnetism’ was a genuine candidate
for the foundation of a medicine that would at last be scientific. Reference to some unknown
fluid to which living beings would be susceptible did not induce any a priori disqualifica-
tion. The fluid is invisible, certainly, but wasn’t that also the case for Newtonian attraction,
whose existence was recognised because of its effects? In this sense, Mesmer’s tub could have
been acknowledged as an apparatus both therapeutic and demonstrative, its healing power
Franz Anton Mesmer and his tub
of magnetic fluid, 1784.
Source: <www.alternativinfo.dk>
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defined itself by transforming into obstacles the whole set of activities that would make a
rat, for example, a meaning-creator, living in an environment that made sense for it. The
imperative for objective description eliminated as simply obstacles everything that, for
instance, is pertinent for ethological description: the fact that the rat is a different animal
to the other inhabitants of psychological laboratories, pigeons or mice. In this sense, the
‘objective rat’ of quantifiable behaviour can be defined as an ‘artefact’, a being of scientific
allure, but which, because of the manipulation that produced it, has been deprived of any
capacity to bear witness to anything that, as it happens, it is being interrogated about …
So here, experimentation has not been able to put on stage a purified natural behaviour
so that this would become intelligible and capable of bearing witness to its own nature.
Experimentation has cobbled together an artificial, laboratory-created behaviour. It did not
endow the rat with the capacity to confirm or refute hypotheses made about it; rather it
‘created a laboratory rat’, a rat that is reduced to a mode of existence subjected to the impera-
tive of observable, quantifiable objectivity, a rat incapable of teaching us anything about free
rats, a rat witness above all to the abuse of power that manufactured it.
Experimentation always runs risks: the risk of silencing something while trying to make
it speak, of remaining the sole author on stage instead of putting on a production. Galileo
took this kind of risk. He took into account the air, its friction merely complicating the move-
ment of falling bodies. The ‘real’ movement, which corresponds to mathematical intelligi-
bility, would happen in a vacuum. And this risk was crowned with success. Ever since the
beginning of the nineteenth century, engineers, who work in a world where (thankfully as
far as our machines are concerned) there is friction, have learned to understand it from the
foundation of an ideal world described by mechanics, then taking into account the effects
of friction which are thus seen as responsible for the complication of real movement.
Galileo took a risk, and the fact that the movement he was talking about revealed itself to
be sensitive to the requirements of the assessment mode he invented belongs to the class
of things I called an ‘event’ in the Invention of Modern Sciences. The event creates a distinc-
tion, which I think is crucial, between theoretico-experimental sciences, which in every case
have ‘made events’ and pseudo-sciences, experimental psychology for example, which make
the laboratory a place where scientific rationality reaffirms its right to submit whatever it is
interrogating to the status of experimental object.
Now, wouldn’t it be the case that, with Pasteur, an event saw the light of day, which is simi-
lar to those that created ‘theoretico-experimental’ sciences? Did he not take the risk of dis-
tinguishing, among epidemic sicknesses, the question of germs and their propagation
from that of the ‘field’, that is, the question of knowing how, when in contact with the
same germs, some fall sick and others not? Should we not acknowledge that in this case
we are dealing with a genuine intervention of medicine into experimental science? Pasteur
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constituting simultaneously the proof of the existence of the fluid and the explanation of
its effects.
Could have been acknowledged … if Mesmer’s apparatus had been able to withstand its
‘scandalisation’. With the doctor Léon Chertok, I have studied in some detail the methods
of the commission appointed by the king Louis XVI.1 Among the participants were import-
ant scientists of the time, such as Antoine Laurent Lavoisier and Benjamin Franklin. To cut
a long story short, they tried, without too much success, to ‘purify’ the phenomena occur-
ring around Charles Deslon’s magnetic tub (Mesmer had refused to cooperate with the
inquiry). After they submitted themselves to the ‘fluid’, then some poor people, then some
representatives from respectable society, all this without arriving at any clear result, the com-
mission invented a much more active method of investigation. It asked an accomplice mag-
netiser to magnetise a ‘likely subject’ without warning him, to pretend to magnetise another
person, or even, the subject having had his eyes blindfolded, to magnetise one part of his
body while announcing another part was to be magnetised. The commission was then able
to conclude that ‘the fluid is powerless without imagination, while the imagination without
the fluid is able to produce the effects that are attributed to the fluid’. In short, the fluid, to
the extent that its effects would prove its existence, did not exist.
Bearing this scene in mind, let me make a point about one of its features, which is
the emergence of the new definition of ‘charlatan’. In order to explain the cures that
nevertheless happened, for good or ill, around Mesmer’s tub, the ‘interdisciplinary’ com-
mission noted:
We see men succumb, it seems, to the same sickness, cured by taking contradictory treat-
ments, and in taking entirely different treatments; Nature is thus powerful enough to sup-
port life in spite of poor treatment, and able to triumph over both illness and its remedy. If
she has this power to resist remedies, then she has all the more reason to have the power to
work without them.
As for the second commission, composed entirely of doctors, it went one step further:
There are multiple and sufficient causes for the results supposedly observed in similar cir-
cumstances: the hopes conceived by the patients, the exercise they carried out every day,
the suspension of the remedies which they might have been using previously and of which
the quantity is often negligible in similar cases.
In other words: the cure proves nothing. I am going to suggest a modern definition of
medicine as the discipline that, in contrast to traditional therapies or to medieval medicine,
does not follow a particular doctrine or set of practices, for these are continually changing,
but rather acts through an awareness of this very changeability. It has a correlate: the aim
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Quite often, distinctions between fields that, in one way or another, relate to modern
scientific rationality tend to be underestimated. So one might cite the example of astronomy
vanquishing astrology, or that of alchemy made a fool of by chemistry, in order to promote
the idea of the same glorious future for all, then to announce that the half light of battle—
where the difference between ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ has not been clearly imposed—only
has a transitory nature, and that all hesitation will evaporate to the extent that scientific
progress will augment the power of rational procedures in each area. From this perspective,
the singularity of medical practice is well and truly in the domain of the ‘not yet’.
The history of science does not have the power to condemn an attitude or a hope, but nor
does it offer the slightest guarantee for this longed-for triumph of experimental rationality.
In fact, I think it even possible that the successes of modern medicine, remarkable as they
are, are not headed in this direction, and therefore confront medicine with a ‘practical chal-
lenge’. But in order to explain this clearly, I have to first distinguish the real meaning of experi-
mentation as the technique that creates reliable witnesses, from the inoffensive and generalist
image it often has of a neutral practice, governed by objective observation and stripped of
belief and bias so that it is limited to the establishment of general relations that should in
principle give birth to a theory.
There is no doubt that when the commissioners tricked Deslon’s subjects, they were using
the power of experimental method. They didn’t just observe; they actively staged something;
they invented a manner of setting out the problem of the fluid such that any parasitical causali-
ties were removed from the scene. Experimentation is an active, inventive practice and, above
all, selective.4 It assumes, implies and turns into reality the possibility of staging a pheno-
menon, controlling it and purifying it in such a way that it becomes what it was not, a wit-
ness responding reliably to the experimenter’s questions. But this possibility, which experi-
mentation brings about, is not at all like a law that can be generalised. Phenomena are not
subjected to experimentation through the simple exercise of power, the one with the most
authority being the one who can manipulate and purify. It is even the case that the pheno-
menon must be in a position to answer to the requirements of experimentation, and capable
of bearing witness to whether or not it is fully purified and not just ‘constructed’.
Let me provide what I think is a counter-example, an example of pseudo-experimentation.
It is the kind of experimental psychology created by John B. Watson and Burrhus F. Skinner,
who had the idea of carrying out experiments on rats and pigeons. In order to do this, they
invented a laboratory arrangement that assumed and activated the elimination of everything
that, in the behaviour of the animal, might bear witness to the site being anything but a pas-
sive one where two types of observable phenomena came together—stimulus and response.
The description that resulted from this procedure could certainly be called ‘objective’, since
it only discovered observable and quantifiable elements. The upshot was that this method
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of medicine (curing) is not sufficient to establish the difference between rational practice and
the practice of the charlatan. The imperative to be rational and the denunciation of the char-
latan join voices in this matter. The charlatan is henceforth defined as he who puts forward
his cures as proofs.
This definition of the ‘charlatan’ makes a modern protagonist of him as well. Using
cures as demonstrations, he makes use of a model of scientific truth and not a tradition of
the supernatural (the latter implying a ‘supernature’ that, for its part, would not let itself
be paraded for examination on the whim of people’s curiosity or demands). It is precisely
because the ‘fluid’ was presented as a ‘modern’ referent, on a par with Newtonian force, as a
‘cause’ capable of imposing its own existence on the basis of the examination of its effects,
that it could succumb to the critical counter-examination of the commissioners. In other
words, not only does the definition of the charlatan I propose not carry any value judgement,
since it is only meant to count as the definition that modern medicine is inventing itself
against, but its range is also strictly limited. It is Mesmer, and not the exorcists whose
practice Mesmer believed he had ‘laicised’ or ‘rationalised’, who falls under the blows of the
1784 commissions’ critique. The devil would have laughed at the clever trick pulled off by
the commissioners.
The commissioners invoke three types of causes to explain the cures attributed to Mesmer’s
magnetic fluid: Nature’s healing power, evidenced by the spontaneous cures of which the
living human body is capable; the patients’ confidence in Mesmer’s treatment; and other
remedies of negligible importance. I will not discuss this third explanation, which medical
progress is perhaps slowly eliminating. However, the two others have lost none of their con-
temporary relevance. On the contrary, under the label of the ‘placebo effect’, the curing power
of trust, hope and ‘faith healing’ are today systematically set out in the protocols that
determine the elevation of a chemical formula to the status of a medicine.2 Modern scientific
medicine can thus officially take into account the virtues of ‘faith healing’, even though it
only recognises the negative side, in the manner of a parasitic effect that runs the risk, if not
taken into account, of impeding medical progress.
So now we can already understand why, unlike astrology, alchemy or creationism in biology,
the ‘other’ of medicine, the charlatan, has not been disqualified once and for all. It is because
the charlatan does not just feed off gullibility and ignorance. From the perspective of modern
medicine, he is the exact correlate of the ‘placebo effect’, which has a parasitic relationship
between a substance and its curative effects. In the same way that the clandestine effect of
the placebo must be identified each time, for each new product, so too must gullibility and
ignorance be disqualified each time, for each new remedy to which the charlatan attri-
butes a healing power. This also allows us to understand, in a parallel way, the curious mean-
ing of the term ‘irrationality’ in medicine. In many doctors’ writings, this term is used in
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between the spoken word and writing and to distinguish between memory and recollection,
and therefore to relegate the so-called remedy to the status of poison. The king limits him-
self to the role of witnessing what the soul requires in its truth. The Royal Road is not that
which the king decides, the king himself speaks in the name of the soul.
Freud can be read as the descendant of the King of the Gods when, disqualifying seeming
curative power by calling it suggestion, he turns psychoanalysis into what the human psyche
requires as its truth. Analysis does not proceed ‘from the outside’ via suggestive pros-
theses, or by a layer of paint applied on the outside (per via di porre). It knows how to get
through the surface (per via di levare) to the real meaning of the symptoms, without using
the least prosthesis or the smallest new element. In this way analysis makes itself the witness
to the soul, creating a firm disjunction between rational procedure, faithful to the requirements
of what it is addressing, and the pharmaka of many non-viable effects, poison-remedies that
fail to recognise this requirement.
Some will no doubt think, even today, that psychoanalysis is this ‘Royal Road’ authorised
by what the human psyche really demands. I am not among them. That is why the 1784
‘scene’ (where the commissioners play a trick to disqualify animal magnetism, this early form
of hypnosis, the use of which is precisely what Freud was criticising when he spoke of old
techniques of suggestion acting per via di porre) inaugurates for me the question that runs
through the whole of the modern ‘art’ of healing. Imagination, to which the commissioners
attributed the power to explain the effects Mesmer had set down to the fluid, is equally
present in the ‘placebo effect’ that haunts the pharmaceutical industry, as well as in the
hint of suggestion that haunts the analytical scene, all the more significant in that it is implicit.
Imagination is also present at the heart of the history of psychiatry, where the semiological
categories of the ‘clinical gaze’, which are supposed to decode mental problems, emerge as
part and parcel of the uncontrollable mixture that is the historically changing and common
matrix shared by the psychiatrist and the patient. The suffering body, or soul, does not have
the power to make the distinction the Royal Road needs: these are not reliable witnesses for
identifying the charlatan as he who would illegitimately claim the power to cure.
The power of experimentation
And yet, Mesmer’s magnetic fluid does not exist. The commissioners’ method certainly made
the magnetised subjects admit this truth, in the same way that double-blind placebo trials,
which occur on a regular basis wherever a chemical substance aspires to the status of medicine,
attribute this capacity of truthfulness to the substances that emerge triumphant, the ones
that have proved that they have the gift of true therapeutic power. So wouldn’t experi-
mentation, then as now, be the ‘Royal Road’ capable of transforming the materials we have
at hand into reliable witnesses?
—
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order to condemn not only charlatans who use cures as proof of some kind of snake oil’s
effectiveness, but also the public that lets itself be taken in by this proof. Doctors themselves
even speak of irrationality in relation to these inexplicable cures, as if, witness to the irra-
tional trust of the sick person, they relate to the fact that this trust has created some sort of
obstacle to the rational progress of medicine.
There is no doubt that we have here a strange use of the notion of irrationality. A priori,
particular calculations and decisions can only be called ‘irrational’ if they are firmly inscribed
in the framework of a determined rational procedure and yet fall outside of or contradict the
guidelines of this procedure. Now, neither the patient nor a fortiori the illness he or she
suffers has taken up the challenge to submit to the rules of a particular procedure. It seems
to me that we have to understand this usage not only in terms of propaganda—aiming to
deflect the public’s attention away from alternative medicines or other non-standardised
practices—but also in more affective terms. ‘Irrationality’ is here invoked to express the per-
ception of a real deception in relation to the suffering body, to express the feeling that the
suffering body, when acting as an accomplice of the charlatans, provides a poor and always
marginal return on the investment of efforts towards rationality made on its behalf.
So while other modern practices hark back to some original triumph, or to a marvellous
narrative about the invention of questions and interpretations that in the end made their
object a reliable witness, capable of making the distinction between a scientific statement
and a fiction, I suggest that modern medicine has an origin that can be read in terms of frust-
ration: the suffering body is not a reliable witness. It can happen that it will be cured for the
‘wrong reasons’.
This frustration awakens old echoes and puts them into dialogue with more recent dis-
appointments. In ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’,3 Jacques Derrida brought to our attention once again
the network of allusions, more technical than metaphorical, which play upon the term
‘pharmakon’—poison or remedy—a network through which Derrida’s reading of Plato autho-
rises a return to the question of writing. Is writing a remedy for memory? In Jean Racine’s
1677 play Phèdre, this is how Thot, the inventor of writing, presents it to the King of the
Gods. But the latter disqualifies it and calls it a poison: ‘Things are recollected from the out-
side, thanks to foreign impressions, and not from the inside of their own accord. So you have
discovered a cure, not for memory, but for recollection.’ This cure for recollection is a poison
for memory, and for the soul rendered forgetful for lack of exercise. With due homage to the
ambiguity of the pharmakon, whose effects vacillate and shuttle between remedy and poison,
I would like to call this privileging the ‘Royal Road’, the road recommended by the King of
the Egyptian Gods. It presupposes a clear distinction: living memory, present to itself, and
operating ‘on the inside’, as against forgetful recollection with its links to prostheses and to
foreign impressions. Let me stress that only the soul itself has the power to create the contrast
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between the spoken word and writing and to distinguish between memory and recollection,
and therefore to relegate the so-called remedy to the status of poison. The king limits him-
self to the role of witnessing what the soul requires in its truth. The Royal Road is not that
which the king decides, the king himself speaks in the name of the soul.
Freud can be read as the descendant of the King of the Gods when, disqualifying seeming
curative power by calling it suggestion, he turns psychoanalysis into what the human psyche
requires as its truth. Analysis does not proceed ‘from the outside’ via suggestive pros-
theses, or by a layer of paint applied on the outside (per via di porre). It knows how to get
through the surface (per via di levare) to the real meaning of the symptoms, without using
the least prosthesis or the smallest new element. In this way analysis makes itself the witness
to the soul, creating a firm disjunction between rational procedure, faithful to the requirements
of what it is addressing, and the pharmaka of many non-viable effects, poison-remedies that
fail to recognise this requirement.
Some will no doubt think, even today, that psychoanalysis is this ‘Royal Road’ authorised
by what the human psyche really demands. I am not among them. That is why the 1784
‘scene’ (where the commissioners play a trick to disqualify animal magnetism, this early form
of hypnosis, the use of which is precisely what Freud was criticising when he spoke of old
techniques of suggestion acting per via di porre) inaugurates for me the question that runs
through the whole of the modern ‘art’ of healing. Imagination, to which the commissioners
attributed the power to explain the effects Mesmer had set down to the fluid, is equally
present in the ‘placebo effect’ that haunts the pharmaceutical industry, as well as in the
hint of suggestion that haunts the analytical scene, all the more significant in that it is implicit.
Imagination is also present at the heart of the history of psychiatry, where the semiological
categories of the ‘clinical gaze’, which are supposed to decode mental problems, emerge as
part and parcel of the uncontrollable mixture that is the historically changing and common
matrix shared by the psychiatrist and the patient. The suffering body, or soul, does not have
the power to make the distinction the Royal Road needs: these are not reliable witnesses for
identifying the charlatan as he who would illegitimately claim the power to cure.
The power of experimentation
And yet, Mesmer’s magnetic fluid does not exist. The commissioners’ method certainly made
the magnetised subjects admit this truth, in the same way that double-blind placebo trials,
which occur on a regular basis wherever a chemical substance aspires to the status of medicine,
attribute this capacity of truthfulness to the substances that emerge triumphant, the ones
that have proved that they have the gift of true therapeutic power. So wouldn’t experi-
mentation, then as now, be the ‘Royal Road’ capable of transforming the materials we have
at hand into reliable witnesses?
—
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order to condemn not only charlatans who use cures as proof of some kind of snake oil’s
effectiveness, but also the public that lets itself be taken in by this proof. Doctors themselves
even speak of irrationality in relation to these inexplicable cures, as if, witness to the irra-
tional trust of the sick person, they relate to the fact that this trust has created some sort of
obstacle to the rational progress of medicine.
There is no doubt that we have here a strange use of the notion of irrationality. A priori,
particular calculations and decisions can only be called ‘irrational’ if they are firmly inscribed
in the framework of a determined rational procedure and yet fall outside of or contradict the
guidelines of this procedure. Now, neither the patient nor a fortiori the illness he or she
suffers has taken up the challenge to submit to the rules of a particular procedure. It seems
to me that we have to understand this usage not only in terms of propaganda—aiming to
deflect the public’s attention away from alternative medicines or other non-standardised
practices—but also in more affective terms. ‘Irrationality’ is here invoked to express the per-
ception of a real deception in relation to the suffering body, to express the feeling that the
suffering body, when acting as an accomplice of the charlatans, provides a poor and always
marginal return on the investment of efforts towards rationality made on its behalf.
So while other modern practices hark back to some original triumph, or to a marvellous
narrative about the invention of questions and interpretations that in the end made their
object a reliable witness, capable of making the distinction between a scientific statement
and a fiction, I suggest that modern medicine has an origin that can be read in terms of frust-
ration: the suffering body is not a reliable witness. It can happen that it will be cured for the
‘wrong reasons’.
This frustration awakens old echoes and puts them into dialogue with more recent dis-
appointments. In ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’,3 Jacques Derrida brought to our attention once again
the network of allusions, more technical than metaphorical, which play upon the term
‘pharmakon’—poison or remedy—a network through which Derrida’s reading of Plato autho-
rises a return to the question of writing. Is writing a remedy for memory? In Jean Racine’s
1677 play Phèdre, this is how Thot, the inventor of writing, presents it to the King of the
Gods. But the latter disqualifies it and calls it a poison: ‘Things are recollected from the out-
side, thanks to foreign impressions, and not from the inside of their own accord. So you have
discovered a cure, not for memory, but for recollection.’ This cure for recollection is a poison
for memory, and for the soul rendered forgetful for lack of exercise. With due homage to the
ambiguity of the pharmakon, whose effects vacillate and shuttle between remedy and poison,
I would like to call this privileging the ‘Royal Road’, the road recommended by the King of
the Egyptian Gods. It presupposes a clear distinction: living memory, present to itself, and
operating ‘on the inside’, as against forgetful recollection with its links to prostheses and to
foreign impressions. Let me stress that only the soul itself has the power to create the contrast
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Quite often, distinctions between fields that, in one way or another, relate to modern
scientific rationality tend to be underestimated. So one might cite the example of astronomy
vanquishing astrology, or that of alchemy made a fool of by chemistry, in order to promote
the idea of the same glorious future for all, then to announce that the half light of battle—
where the difference between ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ has not been clearly imposed—only
has a transitory nature, and that all hesitation will evaporate to the extent that scientific
progress will augment the power of rational procedures in each area. From this perspective,
the singularity of medical practice is well and truly in the domain of the ‘not yet’.
The history of science does not have the power to condemn an attitude or a hope, but nor
does it offer the slightest guarantee for this longed-for triumph of experimental rationality.
In fact, I think it even possible that the successes of modern medicine, remarkable as they
are, are not headed in this direction, and therefore confront medicine with a ‘practical chal-
lenge’. But in order to explain this clearly, I have to first distinguish the real meaning of experi-
mentation as the technique that creates reliable witnesses, from the inoffensive and generalist
image it often has of a neutral practice, governed by objective observation and stripped of
belief and bias so that it is limited to the establishment of general relations that should in
principle give birth to a theory.
There is no doubt that when the commissioners tricked Deslon’s subjects, they were using
the power of experimental method. They didn’t just observe; they actively staged something;
they invented a manner of setting out the problem of the fluid such that any parasitical causali-
ties were removed from the scene. Experimentation is an active, inventive practice and, above
all, selective.4 It assumes, implies and turns into reality the possibility of staging a pheno-
menon, controlling it and purifying it in such a way that it becomes what it was not, a wit-
ness responding reliably to the experimenter’s questions. But this possibility, which experi-
mentation brings about, is not at all like a law that can be generalised. Phenomena are not
subjected to experimentation through the simple exercise of power, the one with the most
authority being the one who can manipulate and purify. It is even the case that the pheno-
menon must be in a position to answer to the requirements of experimentation, and capable
of bearing witness to whether or not it is fully purified and not just ‘constructed’.
Let me provide what I think is a counter-example, an example of pseudo-experimentation.
It is the kind of experimental psychology created by John B. Watson and Burrhus F. Skinner,
who had the idea of carrying out experiments on rats and pigeons. In order to do this, they
invented a laboratory arrangement that assumed and activated the elimination of everything
that, in the behaviour of the animal, might bear witness to the site being anything but a pas-
sive one where two types of observable phenomena came together—stimulus and response.
The description that resulted from this procedure could certainly be called ‘objective’, since
it only discovered observable and quantifiable elements. The upshot was that this method
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of medicine (curing) is not sufficient to establish the difference between rational practice and
the practice of the charlatan. The imperative to be rational and the denunciation of the char-
latan join voices in this matter. The charlatan is henceforth defined as he who puts forward
his cures as proofs.
This definition of the ‘charlatan’ makes a modern protagonist of him as well. Using
cures as demonstrations, he makes use of a model of scientific truth and not a tradition of
the supernatural (the latter implying a ‘supernature’ that, for its part, would not let itself
be paraded for examination on the whim of people’s curiosity or demands). It is precisely
because the ‘fluid’ was presented as a ‘modern’ referent, on a par with Newtonian force, as a
‘cause’ capable of imposing its own existence on the basis of the examination of its effects,
that it could succumb to the critical counter-examination of the commissioners. In other
words, not only does the definition of the charlatan I propose not carry any value judgement,
since it is only meant to count as the definition that modern medicine is inventing itself
against, but its range is also strictly limited. It is Mesmer, and not the exorcists whose
practice Mesmer believed he had ‘laicised’ or ‘rationalised’, who falls under the blows of the
1784 commissions’ critique. The devil would have laughed at the clever trick pulled off by
the commissioners.
The commissioners invoke three types of causes to explain the cures attributed to Mesmer’s
magnetic fluid: Nature’s healing power, evidenced by the spontaneous cures of which the
living human body is capable; the patients’ confidence in Mesmer’s treatment; and other
remedies of negligible importance. I will not discuss this third explanation, which medical
progress is perhaps slowly eliminating. However, the two others have lost none of their con-
temporary relevance. On the contrary, under the label of the ‘placebo effect’, the curing power
of trust, hope and ‘faith healing’ are today systematically set out in the protocols that
determine the elevation of a chemical formula to the status of a medicine.2 Modern scientific
medicine can thus officially take into account the virtues of ‘faith healing’, even though it
only recognises the negative side, in the manner of a parasitic effect that runs the risk, if not
taken into account, of impeding medical progress.
So now we can already understand why, unlike astrology, alchemy or creationism in biology,
the ‘other’ of medicine, the charlatan, has not been disqualified once and for all. It is because
the charlatan does not just feed off gullibility and ignorance. From the perspective of modern
medicine, he is the exact correlate of the ‘placebo effect’, which has a parasitic relationship
between a substance and its curative effects. In the same way that the clandestine effect of
the placebo must be identified each time, for each new product, so too must gullibility and
ignorance be disqualified each time, for each new remedy to which the charlatan attri-
butes a healing power. This also allows us to understand, in a parallel way, the curious mean-
ing of the term ‘irrationality’ in medicine. In many doctors’ writings, this term is used in
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defined itself by transforming into obstacles the whole set of activities that would make a
rat, for example, a meaning-creator, living in an environment that made sense for it. The
imperative for objective description eliminated as simply obstacles everything that, for
instance, is pertinent for ethological description: the fact that the rat is a different animal
to the other inhabitants of psychological laboratories, pigeons or mice. In this sense, the
‘objective rat’ of quantifiable behaviour can be defined as an ‘artefact’, a being of scientific
allure, but which, because of the manipulation that produced it, has been deprived of any
capacity to bear witness to anything that, as it happens, it is being interrogated about …
So here, experimentation has not been able to put on stage a purified natural behaviour
so that this would become intelligible and capable of bearing witness to its own nature.
Experimentation has cobbled together an artificial, laboratory-created behaviour. It did not
endow the rat with the capacity to confirm or refute hypotheses made about it; rather it
‘created a laboratory rat’, a rat that is reduced to a mode of existence subjected to the impera-
tive of observable, quantifiable objectivity, a rat incapable of teaching us anything about free
rats, a rat witness above all to the abuse of power that manufactured it.
Experimentation always runs risks: the risk of silencing something while trying to make
it speak, of remaining the sole author on stage instead of putting on a production. Galileo
took this kind of risk. He took into account the air, its friction merely complicating the move-
ment of falling bodies. The ‘real’ movement, which corresponds to mathematical intelligi-
bility, would happen in a vacuum. And this risk was crowned with success. Ever since the
beginning of the nineteenth century, engineers, who work in a world where (thankfully as
far as our machines are concerned) there is friction, have learned to understand it from the
foundation of an ideal world described by mechanics, then taking into account the effects
of friction which are thus seen as responsible for the complication of real movement.
Galileo took a risk, and the fact that the movement he was talking about revealed itself to
be sensitive to the requirements of the assessment mode he invented belongs to the class
of things I called an ‘event’ in the Invention of Modern Sciences. The event creates a distinc-
tion, which I think is crucial, between theoretico-experimental sciences, which in every case
have ‘made events’ and pseudo-sciences, experimental psychology for example, which make
the laboratory a place where scientific rationality reaffirms its right to submit whatever it is
interrogating to the status of experimental object.
Now, wouldn’t it be the case that, with Pasteur, an event saw the light of day, which is simi-
lar to those that created ‘theoretico-experimental’ sciences? Did he not take the risk of dis-
tinguishing, among epidemic sicknesses, the question of germs and their propagation
from that of the ‘field’, that is, the question of knowing how, when in contact with the
same germs, some fall sick and others not? Should we not acknowledge that in this case
we are dealing with a genuine intervention of medicine into experimental science? Pasteur
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constituting simultaneously the proof of the existence of the fluid and the explanation of
its effects.
Could have been acknowledged … if Mesmer’s apparatus had been able to withstand its
‘scandalisation’. With the doctor Léon Chertok, I have studied in some detail the methods
of the commission appointed by the king Louis XVI.1 Among the participants were import-
ant scientists of the time, such as Antoine Laurent Lavoisier and Benjamin Franklin. To cut
a long story short, they tried, without too much success, to ‘purify’ the phenomena occur-
ring around Charles Deslon’s magnetic tub (Mesmer had refused to cooperate with the
inquiry). After they submitted themselves to the ‘fluid’, then some poor people, then some
representatives from respectable society, all this without arriving at any clear result, the com-
mission invented a much more active method of investigation. It asked an accomplice mag-
netiser to magnetise a ‘likely subject’ without warning him, to pretend to magnetise another
person, or even, the subject having had his eyes blindfolded, to magnetise one part of his
body while announcing another part was to be magnetised. The commission was then able
to conclude that ‘the fluid is powerless without imagination, while the imagination without
the fluid is able to produce the effects that are attributed to the fluid’. In short, the fluid, to
the extent that its effects would prove its existence, did not exist.
Bearing this scene in mind, let me make a point about one of its features, which is
the emergence of the new definition of ‘charlatan’. In order to explain the cures that
nevertheless happened, for good or ill, around Mesmer’s tub, the ‘interdisciplinary’ com-
mission noted:
We see men succumb, it seems, to the same sickness, cured by taking contradictory treat-
ments, and in taking entirely different treatments; Nature is thus powerful enough to sup-
port life in spite of poor treatment, and able to triumph over both illness and its remedy. If
she has this power to resist remedies, then she has all the more reason to have the power to
work without them.
As for the second commission, composed entirely of doctors, it went one step further:
There are multiple and sufficient causes for the results supposedly observed in similar cir-
cumstances: the hopes conceived by the patients, the exercise they carried out every day,
the suspension of the remedies which they might have been using previously and of which
the quantity is often negligible in similar cases.
In other words: the cure proves nothing. I am going to suggest a modern definition of
medicine as the discipline that, in contrast to traditional therapies or to medieval medicine,
does not follow a particular doctrine or set of practices, for these are continually changing,
but rather acts through an awareness of this very changeability. It has a correlate: the aim
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and Koch were able to isolate germs as the specific causes of specific sicknesses. They were
thus able to ‘make them speak’, to make them perform in such a way that they became
reliable witnesses of their own power to cause a sickness and to become its medium for trans-
mission. In a correlative manner, Koch’s postulations were able to justify a theory of infec-
tious disease, in other words a way of thinking about disease from a more economic, that is,
more powerful, standpoint than a mere empirical description. These postulates make
medicine capable of anticipating and ranking problems, with the summit being the identi-
fication of the germ and the establishment of its role.
The examples of Pasteur and Koch show, do they not, that experimentation is the Royal
Road of medicine? The need to have recourse to proof via comparison with a placebo seems
to signify, quite simply, that we do ‘not yet’ have available to us this Royal Road as far as
the whole set of our illnesses are concerned. The expression ‘rational pharmacology’ is a
translation for this kind of hope. One day, the curing power of a chemical substance will
be able to be deduced from a theoretico-experimental knowledge of the human body, and it
is to this knowledge that the substance will owe its status of medicine. For each affliction,
one will be able to deduce the appropriate type of action, the structure of the molecule
that has the power to heal, and it will become less and less necessary to ask if effectiveness
alone will be sufficient to warrant the patient’s trust. On the other hand, the stubborn
character of the charlatan, this artist who works the relationships between the susceptibility
of the suffering body and ‘irrational’ influences, will finally meet its match, something capable
of immediately disqualification, since medicine will have the power to act on the ‘real
causes’ of the problem. Both the placebo effect and the charlatan will have a clear part to play
in the perspective of a future theoretico-experimental medicine. They must disappear: the
placebo because it is the bearer of the basic empirical character of pharmacological research,
and the charlatan because, to the extent that medicine increases its effectiveness, he will lose,
for his part, his power of parasitical seduction.
And yet, the precedent set by Pasteur’s scientific triumph does not constitute either a prom-
ise of or a first step towards this luminous future. This brings me back to question of the
‘field’, which Pasteur opened up in regard to micro-organisms. As far as a micro-organism is
concerned, it makes no difference whether it is in a test tube or a living body. This indiffer-
ence allows the biologist to characterise this position: what environment allows the organ-
ism in question to reproduce itself, and what one diminishes its virulence? Of course, with
immunology, biology and medicine have, ever since Pasteur, contributed massively to the
understanding of the field from the point of view of the contaminated organism itself. But
this is exactly where any resemblance to the theoretico-experimental sciences disappears.
There is nothing simple or spontaneous about the way in which the theoretico-experimental
sciences extend their field of inquiry and the relevance of their practices.5 Nevertheless, there
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astrologer. In this case the polemic is symbolic but it creates
no constraint or problem. In the case of medicine, however—
and I am thinking here of so-called ‘soft’ medicines—the idea
of charlatanism is quite central, as it is continually brought to public attention and debated
over and over again in the press and in public institutions. So in an implicit way charlatanism
organises, as we shall see, medical and pharmaceutical research.
This choice of approach also gives us the entertaining option of identifying a ‘first act’,
that is, both a particular moment and a multifaceted episode, where we can assemble a cast,
and identify and make perform all the significant factors and dilemmas I am going to use for
the purposes of recognising modern medicine.
The scene takes place in Paris in 1784. Two commissions have been appointed to investi-
gate the practices of the Viennese doctor Franz Anton Mesmer. Their main task is to put the
principles underlying his practices to the test. According to Mesmer’s practice, his patients
gather around a tub that contains a magnetic fluid, which has the power to effect the cures
on which his reputation is based. We know that Mesmerian fluid is not part of the present-
day therapeutic arsenal, and that therefore it did not survive the enquiry. Nonetheless, we
must acknowledge that at the time Mesmer’s ‘animal magnetism’ was a genuine candidate
for the foundation of a medicine that would at last be scientific. Reference to some unknown
fluid to which living beings would be susceptible did not induce any a priori disqualifica-
tion. The fluid is invisible, certainly, but wasn’t that also the case for Newtonian attraction,
whose existence was recognised because of its effects? In this sense, Mesmer’s tub could have
been acknowledged as an apparatus both therapeutic and demonstrative, its healing power
Franz Anton Mesmer and his tub
of magnetic fluid, 1784.
Source: <www.alternativinfo.dk>
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An initial problem is this: ever since what we call the modern sciences began, each know-
ledge and practice aspiring to rationality has had to be positioned in relation to them.
Now, from the point of view of the rhetorical and/or practical strategies used for this rational
purpose, the doctor presents a particular case, and for at least three reasons.
First, there is a practice that could be called immemorial: in all civilisations, among all
human groups, in all cultures, there exists and has existed specially designated curers, as
well as therapeutic knowledges transmitted from generation to generation.
Second, the desire to define medicine as a rational practice is, from a historical point of
view, fairly independent from the production of a set of practices we deem rational, in the
sense of improving in a systematic fashion the likelihood for the patient to be cured. In other
words, there is no ‘Galileo’ of medicine who created simultaneously a discourse and a
practice that made a distinct break from the past and was recognisable as the beginning of
‘the history of modern medicine’. One might be tempted to slot Louis Pasteur or Robert Koch
into this role, but they emerged far too late, at a time when everyone thought that modern
medicine was already well under way.
Third, as a profession authorised by a diploma, and the product of teaching organised by
doctors themselves, medicine precedes the appearance of the modern sciences by a long way.
In Europe, medicine was taught in the medieval university, and even at that time it was locked
in a struggle, which continues to this day, pitting degree-bearing doctors against various tra-
ditional types of ‘healer’. This idea of regulating the right to care for patients is a continual
feature of the history of Western medicine. So at what point does one move from a notion
of corporate rights—designating medicine as a profession defending its monopoly—to a
principle that can effectively embrace the logic of rationality? What principle could invoke
the ‘real’ difference between the practices of modern doctors and those of charlatans? Each
case can be examined on its merits, and even today the difference is not always very clear.
Nevertheless, I would like to begin with the question of the ‘charlatan’ to develop my enquiry
into so-called modern medicine. More precisely, I will start with the transformation of the
mode of denunciation that creates the object ‘charlatan’, and with the transformation of
the charlatan’s identity.
This approach first of all relates to the fact that in medicine the theme of rationality has
a polemical accent that is not in evidence anywhere else. Of course, there is a polemical angle
to the way chemistry is distinguished from alchemy, astronomy from astrology and Darwinian
biology from the ‘static’ doctrine of the species. But in each of these cases the polemic is part
of the foundation narrative, or part of the edifying pedagogy. Astrology is not stalking astro-
nomy, and the latter does not feel in the slightest danger of being confused with this ‘other’,
which in any case it has scarcely ever encountered. There is no procedure in the repertoire
of the astronomer that is designed to establish a distinction with the knowledge of the
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is a recognisable style to the story, which can, a posteriori, set the scene for this extension.
A posteriori, what is recounted and transmitted in scientific manuals resembles what the
philosopher Immanuel Kant characterised as the effects of the ‘Copernican revolution’, which
allows a scientific field to depart from empirical practice. For Kant, this so-called ‘Coper-
nican revolution’ translates the fact that the scientist no longer learns from the phenomenon,
but imposes his own questions on it. This means that the scientist imposes a point of view
on the phenomenon and this allows him to predict a priori which questions are relevant
and which adjustments will bring to light the dominant causal relationships organising all
the others.
This is certainly the story one can tell about the extension of Galilean mechanics, but not
about the kind of medicine derived from Pasteur and Koch. We know now that the question
left hanging by Pasteur (that of the epidemic ‘field’ from the point of view of the infected
organism’s reactions) opened a real Pandora’s box, and that there is now no story that can, a
posteriori, give it a ‘Copernican’ spin. To the question ‘why does one fall sick?’, the immune
system, a network where many interdependent causalities are operating, offers no simple
answer. Certainly there has been progress both in terms of knowledge and modes of treat-
ment, but this progress is a long way from keeping pace with a mode of explanation that is
becoming more economical, more powerful, and capable of always establishing more stable
distinctions among what is cause, what is consequence and what is of no importance at all.
The definition of sickness that begins with the micro-organism has not had the power to
rank things and become the Royal Road towards the definition of sickness from the point of
view of the patient. It has been the entry point into a labyrinth of subtle questions, the ins
and outs of which biologists and doctors must explore, now and in the future, in order to
learn from the living body what it is capable of doing.
Pasteur and Koch thought they had discovered the perspective determining the landscape
of causal or functional relationships that define epidemic illness. I maintain that, no matter
how sophisticated its technical instrumentation has become, epidemiology is today defined
by a form of empiricism: by the necessity to test, observe and describe, in short, to learn from
the phenomenon without having the power of deciding a priori what questions to ask it. I
stress this point because often the highly technical character of biomedical description is
deceptive. How, for example, when we talk of the chemistry of the brain, can we dare speak
of empiricism while we have, on an ongoing basis, more and more precise pictures con-
veying metabolic intensities of different cerebral regions, and while we can identify speci-
fic neuronal sites and their corresponding neurotransmitters? Still, one speaks comfort-
ably, even in this case, of fundamentally empirical research. In fact, between the richness
of the psychic effects of a drug, for example, and the hypothesis that states that the drug is
modifying the effects of a class of neurotransmitters, there is a gulf that no contemporary
Curing for the wrong reasons
We all know, in fact we are sure, that our medical practices are very different from those in
the times of Molière or of Louis XVI. In one way or another medicine has today become
‘modern’ in the same way as the whole set of knowledges and practices that call them-
selves rational. This is obvious, but I would like to interrogate this obviousness. Not to debunk
it so as to show that beyond these appearances nothing has changed, but in order to focus
in a slightly clearer way on ‘what’ has changed. To be even more precise, I would like to focus
on ‘what’ has changed for the doctor, the one who practises medicine.
Today’s accumulated knowledges about living organisms, plus the biochemical and meta-
bolic techniques of analysis and modes of visualisation and imaging, will all play a part in
what I want to do, but will not be my prime concern, because they relegate the doctor to the
role of communication relay between the individual patient and the body of general bio-
logical knowledge. Nor do I want to focus on the institutions, industries, administrative regu-
lations and financing channels that also contribute to the shaping of medical practices. In
short, I am not dealing with medicine in general, with its problems, its inertias, its ambi-
tions, its more or less vicious circles or its occasional uncontrollable waywardness. Nor is
there anything sociological about the question I am posing. I am not interested in knowing
‘who’ the doctor is, but rather ‘what’ it means, ever since medicine became modern, to be a
doctor, to be involved with a ‘suffering body’ and to be involved with it in the context of
a supposedly rational framework. In other words, what does it mean for the doctor to be
carrying out a rational practice?
the doctor and the charlatan
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theory is able to leap over. What this mode of description puts on stage is, first and foremost,
a set of correlations between two distinct modes of approach to psychic function, two modes
that are privileged by the sole fact that they are both accessible to observation.
Of course, nobody would deny that there ‘must’ be a relationship between the effect of a
drug and the modification of neurone transmission. But it is exactly this ‘there must be a
relationship’ which defined the practical field of empiricism: the research is dominated by
whether or not the observations are accessible, observations between which ‘there must be
a relationship’ and between which all sorts of correlations can in fact be established. But the
significance of what is observable as well as their correlations is open to an indeterminate
number of interpretations. No doubt we have increasingly powerful technical means to mea-
sure, and even to create, new possibilities of observation as far as the different aspects of
cerebral activity are concerned, but what we measure and observe does not have the power
to determine the correctness of what is, in that way, observed and measured.
Let’s go back to Deslon’s tub, where what was revealed was the power of experimental
method in the fight against the modern version of the charlatan, the one who makes him-
self the representative of a ‘cause’ claiming the power to bring about physiological trans-
formations in whatever circumstances. So what was going on around the Mesmerian tub?
The scene of the tub illustrates the asymmetrical nature of experimental method as far as
medicine is concerned. It allowed for elimination, for the destruction of pretensions, and
refutations, but it remained silent on the cures that were actually observed. No doubt
these were attributed to the ‘imagination’ of the patients. But imagination, as much as
‘faith healing’, is just a way of disqualifying the phenomenon rather than understanding it.
Incidentally, Deslon complained that the commissioners did not define what they meant by
this ‘imagination’, to which they attributed the power to cure.
It is interesting to note that among the commissioners the only one to criticise the judge-
ment of the commission, in a minority report, claiming no interest in Mesmerian practices,
was a naturalist, that is, a practitioner of empirical method: the great botanist Antoine Laurent
de Jussieu. Jussieu stressed that even if the commission successfully refuted an incorrect
idea, that did not mean they had a greater understanding of what was going on around
Deslon’s tub. Because the procedure of his majoritarian colleagues depended on a hypothesis
of simple causality, all they did was substitute a hypothetically ‘simple’ cause, imagination,
for another simple cause, fluid. In fact they had staged the phenomenon by defining it as the
site of a contest between two possible causes: either fluid or imagination. By why not
imagine multiple causality, where ‘moral’ causes (whence ‘imagination’) would interfere with
‘physical’ causes (the ‘touchings’ that magnetisers performed and that Jussieu himself had
occasion to test the effectiveness of). If the two types of causes could have, in certain cir-
cumstances, the same type of effect, the protocols for the commissioners’ inquiry would lose
essays
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their demonstrative value. In fact, one could, claimed Jussieu, conceive that the ‘moral cause’,
the idea that one is not magnetised, thwarts the action of the hypothetical ‘physical cause’,
while on the other hand, when the two causes are effectively married, the effect is increased,
which is what is observed around the tub. Jussieu finished by calling for an empirical
study of the therapeutic possibilities of what he called a ‘touching medicine’, removed from
any influence of fashion or any study of the spectacular.
Jussieu, in his own way, put a question to his experimenting colleagues about the limits
of experimentation in the situation where one is addressing a being capable of hope and
imagination. He did, in fact, underscore the proposition that ‘the idea that one is not mag-
netised’ is not simply the absence of factors linked to the imagination, but also brings in a
certain type of imagination, perhaps as active as the other and even capable of annulling
other effects. The commissioners reduced imagination to a binary variable, which they could
activate on its own, when, for example, they falsely supposed that a subject was magnetised,
or which they could reduce to zero when they had a subject magnetised without knowing
it. But the imagination does not allow itself to be reduced to zero under experimental con-
ditions. Subjects can’t be stopped imagining, interpreting, or taking up a position on what
they are being subjected to, or on what they feel.
Who defines the causes?
As the inquiry of Lavoisier and his colleagues showed, followed by the medicine of Pasteur,
experimental procedure constitutes a Royal Road in as much as it puts to the test whether
the candidates for causality (the cause of a cure or an illness) have in themselves the power
of causality. But this Road cannot be adopted by decision (be it Royal, methodological or
rational). The King of the Egyptian Gods was not able to disqualify writing except by making
himself representative of the soul, which is to suppose that the soul can qualify a represen-
tative. In the same way, experimental procedure requires that what one is dealing with can
become capable of engendering ‘experimental facts’. This comes about when, in one way or
another, the experimenter invents a way of taking the initiative, of staging a situation that
responds to his question: the magnetiser’s accomplice magnetising a subject while pre-
tending to magnetise another; Pasteur inoculating sheep; a doctor medicating double blind,
giving some a substance without physiological effect and others a possibly active substance.
The initiative means that the experimenter, faced with a possible ‘cause’, requires this ‘cause’
to show its effects in an unambiguous manner, in a situation that has been actively stripped
of any possibility that other unidentified clandestine factors might intervene. This initiative
always takes the form of a variation on the situation, whether this variation is continuous,
which is most often the case in physics, or binary (presence/absence), when the staging of
the scene relates to logic rather than an activation of quantitative measures.
—
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The fluid invoked by Mesmer was in fact a candidate for the type of cause that is supposed,
by definition, to respond to the requirements of experimental testing. But this is not the same
for the imagination. Imagination is not a true variable because the experimenter is not free
to control the variations. He cannot, for example, tell the subjects what they are supposed
to be imagining and stop them incorporating ‘parasitical’ elements that would transform the
meaning of the experimental situation. From the experimental point of view, the question
of imagination emerges as an obstacle, because it constitutes a rival counter-power oppos-
ing the experimenter’s monopoly on the definition of the therapeutic scene. The living body
itself intervenes in the definition of the causes that act on it.
And if the body thus has an initiatory power, if it intervenes instead of submits, the experi-
mental mise en scène is no longer in itself a simple mise en scène, which was a condition for
proof. It becomes an irreducible ingredient of the situation. The researcher’s initiative, posing
the questions, looking for proof, comes up against the fact that the other, the one he is address-
ing, has not been submitted to this initiative, like a chemical compound is submitted to
purification, for example. The proof, for this other, is a test, to which the researcher gives a
meaning. This test affects him in ways that the very conditions of the procedure of proof ren-
der untestable. The procedure of proof can henceforth become the creator of artefacts, ‘facts’
that are purely relative to the experimental situation. This is, by the way, what for fifty years
the history of experimental attempts to define hypnosis have shown, at their own expense.6
Certainly statistical inquiries allow us to circumvent this uncontrollable individual dimen-
sion. But between statistics involving large numbers and the understanding of individual
cases, we find the same difference as that which lies between the negative power to eliminate
illegitimate candidates to the status of causality and the positive power to understand how
‘causes cause’. The first, the negative power, does not lead to the second, the power of under-
standing, but rather allows us to forget it. And it is when doctors are confronted by this
difference, when they are frustratingly reminded of the annoying fact that the living body is
an obstacle to the procedures of proof, that they are tempted to speak of irrationality, or, with
derision, of the ‘placebo effect’.
The dissymmetry between the negative power of experimentation in medicine and the
obstacles in the way of positively defining, in other instances, the situations it is interrogating
is therefore not a simple anecdotal difficulty, which sooner or later would eliminated after
the usual progress is made. The ‘question of the imagination’ is the symptom of a practical
contradiction between the constraints defining the laboratory and the modes of existence of
the living creatures who are interrogated there. The laboratory needs a system that will
respond to a definition in terms of variables, such that it can ‘make it speak’, while the beings
about whom the question of the imagination is being asked ‘respond’ in a totally different
sense, according to the meanings they themselves lend to their environment. How can one
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cultures of the present. Sara Wills and Kate Darian-Smith, on the other hand, move from
cultures of the present to the past as they turn a quasi-ethnographic gaze onto the Frankston
festival celebrating a Britishness that is fading, and perhaps distorting, memories and identity.
Cross-cultural work of a different kind is demonstrated by Minoru Hokari and Alison
Lewis, both of whom are concerned with historical imagination and the nation-state. Hokari,
who has done historical fieldwork in Gurindji country, here attempts to use reflections on
his subjectivity as a Japanese researcher to break open old debates between black and white
in Australia and re-locate reconciliation issues, at last, in a more global register. Lewis reports
a recent bout in Germany’s disputative memory culture.
In an outstanding ‘New Writing’ section, Linda Neil offers a stunning piece of family
memory-work and John Kinsella performs poetically a reflection on ‘A Loss of Poetics’. Finally,
among many excellent reviews, is another piece that engages our theme: who indeed are the
charlatans in the debate about Indigenous history that Keith Windschuttle has whipped up?
Taking a fresh and challenging approach, Klaus Neumann asks just why it is that historical
debate is so often, in historical circles, content to dwell on the past, deploying a regime of
truth that can only imply, and not fully discuss, questions of culture: as if what we think
about Indigenous presence (or absence) in our conception of the nation is only a question
of facts and has nothing to do with the constant work of the plastic arts that are Australian
identities.
Two things to look out for with our next issue: we will be launching a new section, ‘Pro-
vocations’, where we’ll feature excitations, debates and disputations; and we’re shifting
our publishing schedule so that, from 2004, we’ll appear in March and September.
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avoid the artefact if the laboratory must eliminate, in order to give the scientist the power to
ask his own questions, the counter-power constituted by ‘interpretation’, whether conscious
or not, coming to them from the beings interrogated?
Apparently, the meanings that a micro-organism gives to its environment are stable enough
so that experimental interrogation does not, in its case, create mere artefacts of the situation.
This is why Pasteur was able to study the question of the ‘field’ (test-tube or living body)
from the point of view of its germs. But the almost paranoid precautions to ensure the repro-
ducibility of experiments in the case of experimental psychology are witness to the fact that,
even for rats and pigeons, the experimental mise en scène creates an ‘artefact’. In effect it cre-
ates observable variables (how many times does a rat swim in a Porsolt tank before going
under?) for which the first significance is to set oneself up against what one is supposed to
be studying. Whatever definition we might think of giving to the ‘mind’ of a rat, one thing
is sure: the art of experimental proof carried out in laboratories, where ‘animal models’ are
used to test ‘medications’ aiming to modify human psychic behaviour, does not take this
mind into account, but actively denies the problem of its existence.
But in speaking of practical contradictions, isn’t one attributing to the ‘mind’ of a rat, or
that of the patient, something of a spiritual capacity to create their own meanings? Why aban-
don the hope for a future where this capacity would itself become one of many variables,
at the very least because it keeps in the background the good old opposition between material
at hand and the free spirit of inquiry. It is because of this type of objection that it is not
useless to consider the example given today by the sciences in which experimental procedure
has dominated. It is not a question of looking among these sciences for a ‘point of view’ for
imagination, suffering, interpretation or suggestion. Contemporary physics or chemistry do
not offer us interpretative resources. They authorise the simple statement that there is nothing
mysterious or spiritualist in supposing that a living body may not satisfy experimental require-
ments. That there is nothing surprising in encountering ‘causes’ that can be identified as vari-
ables, which one can identify and put into play as one pleases. In fact, the exploration of the
qualitative difference between, on the one hand, systems that function in equilibrium, or
close to it, and those, on the other, whose relationships with their environment keep them
far from equilibrium allows us to conclude that it is in exceptional situations where one can
separate a cause from its effects in a general and reproducible manner.
Apparently the difference between these two situations, in equilibrium and way out of
equilibrium, is purely quantitative and certainly without mystery. In a state of equilibrium,
the exchanges between a system and its environment are either nil or balanced, as is the case,
for example, when a glass of water is in thermal equilibrium with the room it is in. Main-
taining something out of equilibrium simply means that the exchanges with the environ-
ment carry out certain processes for which the system is the base. It stops them therefore
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One of the tasks of the humanities academic—the philosopher, the cultural studies
researcher—is to devise informed judgement through the exercise of a complex intelligence.
It’s a matter, one might think, of sorting out the truth from bullshit and telling it how it is.
If only the world would just stay simple … This directness has some appeal, until you
start trying to specify the appropriate criteria, grounding and form for judgement. Disciplines
address precisely these issues, and to the extent to which they do so successfully, they spec-
ify complex phenomena in particular ways; they authorise certain kinds of enquiry and
speech as they productively cultivate their own patch of knowledge. Cultural studies has
made interdisciplinarity its business, bewitched and distracted by the complexities of
actual existing cultural practices, by spatial and temporal mobility and seepage, by authority
and exclusion, ownership, belonging and boundaries.
The philosopher of science Isabelle Stengers gives us a tag for this issue as she crosses the
humanities–sciences divide and asks what procedures distinguish true scientists from char-
latans, dwelling on the case of Franz Mesmer in the late eighteenth century. Medical science,
in particular, has had a hard time shaking off quasi-scientific ‘healers’ whose success seems
unaccountable. Medicine itself remains full of mystery, and Stengers challenges sciences in
general to embrace the risks of innovative experiment and collective responsibility.
A variety of historical engagements and explorations in historicity provide material for
our other essays. The mania for historical re-enactment, ‘lived’ history, is explored by Simone
Bignall and Mark Galliford through a study of the replication of the Duyfken, the ship from
whose decks Cape York was sighted by Europeans on the first recorded occasion in 1606.
They show how the replication of history is a detailed business that has much to do with
editorial
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from evolving towards a situation where they are statistically compensated by opposite
processes. From the point of view of the definition of the system—that is, the definition of
the processes for which it is the base, the interactions that characterise it, and therefore the
mathematical equations that describe it—it did not seem that non-equilibrium should be
able to contribute anything new at all. This is why, incidentally, physical chemistry remained
for a long time centred on the study of systems in equilibrium, by far the more simple.
Today we know that this is no longer the case. Far from equilibrium, certain physico-
chemical systems are likely to adopt a new kind of behaviour, the behaviour that Ilya Prigogine
has called ‘dissipative structures’.
Dissipative structure was introduced into the heart of physics as a concept that, until then,
had belonged exclusively to biology or to political thought: the concept of ‘self-organisation’.
I will limit myself here to highlighting that physico-chemical self-organisation indicates first
and foremost a transformation in the type of causality on the basis of which it is possible
to describe the entropy-producing macroscopic activity of a physico-chemical system. In
equilibrium, or in regimes approaching it, it is possible to assert that the dissipative activity
of a system is entirely determined by its relations with the environment: it is nil in equili-
brium, and it corresponds, in a near-to-equilibrium state, to a minimum compatible with
the exchanges, and is therefore deducible from these exchanges. On the other hand, the acti-
vity of dissipative structures can no longer be defined as deducible from the exchanges with
the environment that are nevertheless its necessary condition. In other words, the ‘control
variables’ that describe the exchanges with the environment, here lose their status of suffi-
cient and necessary determinants, in order to become constraints that make an activity possi-
ble. It is in this sense that this activity could be called ‘self-organised’.
The very identity of the system can be transformed in another way: factors insignificant
to equilibrium, such as the existence of a gravitational field, can come to play a crucial role
when one is far from equilibrium, that is, they render the ‘system’ capable of differentiated
but coherent regimes of activity. So, without gravitation, whose influence can be negligible
when a layer of liquid is in equilibrium, the spectacular Bénard cells do not form in this liquid
layer when it is heated from beneath. Far from equilibrium, gravitation is not simply a
synonym of ‘weight’, acting in the same manner on each molecule, it makes possible quali-
tatively new collective behaviours.
The sensitivity of a system far from equilibrium to factors that were insignificant, or
negligible in equilibrium, is a very important conceptual discovery. In effect it means that
whatever has the status of cause, which should intervene in the description and the pre-
diction of a behaviour, is not given once and for all. It is the very activity of the system, which
here determines what will, for it, have the status of a cause and how this cause will cause.
Physical chemists had the habit of deducing the possible behaviours of a system on the basis
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of its definition. They presupposed, therefore—and this is what we usually mean by ‘system’—
that the power of defining a system’s activity comes from its definition. The notion of
physico-chemical self-organisation gives us the idea that, in the far-from-equilibrium situ-
ation, it is the other way around: activity determines the manner in which the system should
be defined.
Of course, physical chemists maintain the notion of system, even in far-from-equilibrium
situations. They have the power to do this since what they study is prepared in a laboratory,
because the elements in interaction are known to them, because they know what their
definition of system in equilibrium has neglected. The fact that the system can integrate into
its activity factors insignificant to the equilibrium thus constitutes for them a new tool for
exploration: since the regime of the activity of a system far from equilibrium is not deducible
from its equilibrium definition, to study this regime is also to study the stability or instabi-
lity of this definition, or to ask the question of knowing under what conditions the system
can become ‘sensitive’ to what was, in other conditions, nothing but noise.
Theories coming from physics or chemistry always enjoy enormous prestige. This is why
I hesitated to use an argument linked to these sciences, fearing it would come back in an
inverted form: so that’s what the secret of this ‘placebo effect’ is—a simple question of sen-
sitivity in a far-from-equilibrium situation … Now, the term ‘sensitivity’ can perhaps keep
the precise meaning physical chemistry gives it when it is a matter of posing the problem of
phenomena that escape the laboratory definition but respond to the same type of model,
atmospheric phenomena for example. The term only functions as an a fortiori type of argument
when the laboratory definitions no longer communicate with the possibility of a practical
application of the problem, that is, when the dissymmetry between the positive and nega-
tive powers of experimentation comes to bear.
The example of physical chemistry in far-from-equilibrium situations does not have the
function of proposing a new model, but of dismantling the general view that sees rationality
coincide with the triumph of experimentation. There is no need for dramatic oppositions,
between the submission of the object and the liberty of the subject, for example, in order to
articulate the limits of experimentation. Already the system far from equilibrium stops
responding to its limit conditions in way that the system in equilibrium responds to them.
The obedience of a dog implies yet another set of meanings, and as far as human obedi-
ence goes, like doing exactly what the experimenter tells you to do (and Milgram’s experi-
ment is witness to this7), this is enough to turn more than one person into an executioner in
the name of science. It is the same thing when it comes to the term ‘respond’, which is found
just as much in physical chemistry (how a system ‘responds’ to a perturbation or to a
transformation to its limit conditions) as in a clinic (how a patient ‘responds’ to the varied
doses of a medication). Every clinical mise en scène that establishes a relationship of
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resemblance between these two sorts of response has devoted itself to the systematic pro-
duction of artefacts.
A practical challenge
Let’s go back to the identity of ‘modern medicine’ as I defined it in the beginning. It might
seem now that this definition certainly recognises the ‘power of the imagination’, but in such
a way that the practical question this power gives rise to might rather be avoided than
elaborated on. More exactly, it implies the hope that one day this challenge will disappear
of its own accord, when the dissymmetry that characterises experimental power in medicine
will be reabsorbed, when this experimentation, the Royal Road finally opened, will be able
to identify positively viable modes of action, instead of limiting itself to the elimination of
illegitimate candidates.
Here the famous parable of the streetlight might come to mind. A helpful passer-by,
after having assisted a certain man for a time who has lost his keys near the illuminated
streetlight, ventures to ask him if he is sure he lost them there; no, replies the man, not at
all, but this is the only place where one can see …
Can one ‘see’ otherwise? Asking this question in terms of a ‘practical challenge’ means
abandoning the perspective of progress that the illumination of other streetlights might sym-
bolise, and thus would stretch even further the field of investigation. I have not the slightest
doubt that streetlights will multiply in the future, nor the slightest scepticism about the
interest in what they will illuminate. But here I want to speak of medicine as the ‘art of
curing’ and take seriously its rationalist task. This implies putting into the spotlight the
situation that prevails today, where rationality is entirely on the side of techniques and of
medicines emerging from ever more varied and rigorous testing, while the doctor
is limited to a representative role, even if it means that his ‘human’ or ‘psychological’ qualities
create the ‘added effect of soul’, incontrollable and precious, which signs the medical act.
Such a situation purely and simply reproduces the dissymmetry marking the powers of
experimentation: all the dynamism lies on the side of the accumulation of ‘means’, incited
by the streetlights of progress in the laboratory, while the relation between the doctor and
the patient remains in the shadow of good will and difficult-to-communicate experiences.
A practical challenge does not mean ‘only’ a practical challenge. The term practical is
steeped in meaning, while certain people give subaltern connotations to its usage, of the
type, ‘in theory that is what should happen, but in practice …’ I use the word ‘practical’ in
the sense that all theories presuppose a practice, to the point where a practice is implied even
if we say something exists or not, and this relates back to the practice. Practice is first of all
the manner in which we address ourselves to whatever it is we are dealing with, the require-
ment that it satisfy certain criteria, and, finally, the need for it to be obliged by the way in
—
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which it responds to this mode of address. At the risk of being trivial, I will recall that
what we require of a table has little to do with what a specialist in microscopy is looking for
in wood fibres, which for their part have little relevance for the techniques of analysing atoms
in the chemical sense, which … To be more relevant, I will stress that Mesmer’s ‘fluid’ does
not exist according to the criteria of practical experimentation, because it does not satisfy its
requirements, but the question that Mesmerian practices evoke is nevertheless still there.
They only become ‘irrational’, retrospectively, through pretence to a type of rationality that
didn’t suit them in the first place.
How can one understand the practical challenge of a ‘rational’ medicine without going
back to the streetlight of experimental progress? In other words, how can we become worthy
of the problems we impose on our object of enquiry, in this case, the suffering body. The
experimenter subscribes to the obligations of rationality with which his practice is engaged
to the extent that he is obliged to ask questions about the difference between experimental
fact and artefact. In this sense his practice is, and should be, a polemical one, centred as
much on dispensing with artefacts as on inventing new types of facts. If the art of curing does
not allow one to oppose experimental fact and artefact, if the suffering body cannot become
a reliable witness, authenticating the ‘real doctor’ as against the ‘charlatan’, then wouldn’t
the ‘polemical’ definition of medicine, centred on chasing charlatans, become incongruous?
I do not want to suggest by this that the figure of the ‘modern charlatan’, who believes
proof lies in the successful cures he has brought about, should be revived. As far as that goes
he is of no more interest than the ‘placebo effect’ itself, symptom like him of the difference
between cure and experimental demonstration. The ‘placebo effect’ is one of these proofs
that a chemical substance has to overcome in order to be considered a medicine, and
the charlatan will continue to be considered the ‘other’ of the pharmaceutical industry to the
extent that the industry is obliged to establish that it is not just producing snake oil. But
hunting down charlatans has the same limitations as the art of proof in medicine, in that it
allows for the disqualification of the false pretenders and not the positive identification of
genuine ones. And it is to these limitations that positive requirements have to be attached,
thus defining the singularity of the art of healing.
So I will suggest, at my own peril, a radical disjunction between those sites that are no
doubt relevant for medicine but do not control it, where the hunt for the charlatan and
negative proof prevail, and those where, on the contrary, these two ingredients should
stop haunting medical practice, sites where it is a matter of curing rather than proving.
Whether my proposal is considered ‘rational’ or not can be verified from the predictable
reactions it will provoke: ‘But if we renounce our differences from these vulgar charlatans,
the doctors will say, it will be carte blanche; we will be able to do whatever we like!’ So a true
proof is really needed to create something ‘worthy’ of a practice that will be more than just
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arbitrary, particularly if all reference to the Royal Road is to be lost, along with the fictional
idea that the suffering body ‘should’ be able to tell the difference between the real doctor and
the charlatan.
At this point we should bear in mind that the charlatan, as I have defined this figure, is
the modern charlatan: like the doctor, this charlatan considers his activity ‘rational’ because
it is proven by the success of his treatment. Consequently he thinks he is gleaning theoretico-
experimental practices from real life. He thus has no direct relation with what I would call,
to use the generic term, ‘curers’. And it is thus that Tobie Nathan’s challenging question comes
into play: wouldn’t we have something to learn from those curers, whose common charac-
teristic is of not being haunted by the ideal of a Royal Road capable by definition of dis-
qualifying Others, but rather of having cultivated what one could call, following Nathan, an
‘influencing practice’.8
It is appropriate here to distinguish ‘influence’ in Nathan’s sense, from ‘suggestion’, ‘imagi-
nation’ or ‘placebo effect’ because these last three terms—even if they are not defined
pejoratively in line with the pervasive theme of the irrational—designate an ingredient held
to be ‘natural’, ‘psychological’, ‘found everywhere’, and not a technical thought likely to bring
specific teaching to the art of curing. Suggestion is what we are all likely to be able to carry
out, like Monsieur Jourdain,9 without even knowing it. Influence implies the expert; it
implies a knowledge whose power and interest are, as Nathan shows, to ‘technicise the thera-
peutic relation’.
The way in which Nathan proposes to rehabilitate the ‘thought constraint’, created by so-
called ‘traditional’ therapeutic apparatuses, a constraint that ‘affiliates’ the sick person to a
world where what he lives makes sense, and in relation to which he can construct himself
as a member of a group for whom what he is living has a signification, crashes head-on
into the double idealist register we inhabit. Equally scandalised would be the two western
rivals vying for the Royal Road of therapy: the ‘knowing how to listen’ of psychoanalysis and
the experimental purification of ‘modern’ medicine. Through coercion, violence, suggestion
and the deliberate creation of artefacts, these two enemy brothers will denounce the treachery
constituted by ‘the fabrication of brainwashed patients’ in relation to the truth project that
defines them respectively.10
But the price that the ideal of the Royal Road must pay appears at the same time. The King
of the Gods pretended to tell the truth about memory, and the experimental method was
produced when, in relation to often quite insignificant phenomena, such as rolling balls or
micro-organisms, a claim of this type managed to resist any tests likely to challenge it. West-
ern therapies, haunted by the ideal of a Royal Road, and by the idea of constituting the
suffering body as viable witness of its symptom, are moved by a requirement that, even if
it could never be satisfied, works: they can and must, writes Nathan, ‘weld the symptom VOL.9 NO.2 NOV 2OO3 edited by chris healy and stephen muecke
charlatans
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to the person’. This means that the patient must be ‘alone’, in the face of an apparatus of
knowing that defines him through a problem whose parameters relate to the collective to
which the therapist is, for his part, connected.
So the proposition engages us strongly, but not in any arbitrary way. To the contrary, the
inductive apparatus of links and meanings, which Nathan describes, takes up the practical
challenge that I have tried to identify: to recognise that whatever throws up obstacles to our
ideals and our practical requirements is nothing other than the singularity of the thing we
are dealing with, and to become capable of addressing ourselves to this singularity without
trying to eliminate it or skirt around it. If the psyche, ‘the spirit’, but also the body, which
the ‘placebo effect’ is witness to, are made in relation to each other, they cannot ‘respond’ to
a treatment without also ‘making each other’ on the basis of this treatment. ‘Influence’ desig-
nates a practical thought with a bearing on this fabrication.
Having said that, learning does not mean imitating. As Tobie Nathan often highlights, cul-
tural affiliations are not improvised. If the curer does not do ‘whatever he likes’, it is because
he too has come from the very culture that he affiliates his patient to. The ‘culture’ of modern
medicine, haunted as it is by the charlatan and the art of proof, defines the sick person a
priori as a virtual member of the statistical group that is tested for whatever ends up being
prescribed, or, for the psychoanalyst, as a ‘case’ who can appear in publication for the edi-
fication of his colleagues. This culture is certainly likely to ‘affiliate’ the patient—that is,
transform him into a living witness believing in his powers—and no doubt this affiliation is
an ingredient of the therapeutic effectiveness. But, short of founding his own sect, the doctor,
as far as ‘modern’ culture defines him today, cannot aim for such an affiliation, or find a way
of cultivating it, or admit it as an official player on the therapeutic stage.
At this point, I am the closest I will get to one of the great specialities of western intellectual
production, to the very signature of its modernity when it is at its most lucid. The sad fact
is that we have lost forever a resource whose precious nature we only now recognise, but
which we are also unable artificially to recreate. So only the grand final movement remains:
the appeal to carry out the heroic task of deepening our uniqueness, while accepting the dis-
enchantment of the world of which we are vectors, yet simultaneously falling once again for
what is no more than a caricature of what we have destroyed, those sects that are prolifer-
ating and know how to ‘affiliate’ those who approach them. I do not have the least intention
of falling into this convenient formula; the best it has going for it is safety in numbers and
less risk of being called naive.
In the anonymous area where the question is kept open are certainly those whose work
of apprenticeship Nathan appeals to, as they learn to describe in a careful way the therapists
and their techniques. The question here is less one of imitation than the transformation of
the one who is interested by what interests him. His stake is not just to stop the destruction
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of the therapeutic techniques of ‘others’, in accordance with the maxim ‘to each his technique’.
For this type of tolerance, work is not necessary. Its stake is indissociable from the role of
inventing and being invented by those who, among us, will come out of this work, those
who will have learnt the requirements and accepted the obligations. We do not know what
kinds of resources they will be able to mobilise in the heart of our tradition, or which frag-
ments, which seem to us to have nothing to do with medicine, they will appropriate in order
to reconvert them. Did not the Darwinians, for example, redefine techniques of police
investigation—traces and indexes—in their own way? We do not know; nevertheless, one
thing for me seems certain: it is not just what we call a doctor that will be reinvented, but
also what we call a patient.
The example that Tobie Nathan gives is very significant on this point: from the first
steps of a piece of research, which he tells us has not yet begun, he begins his assault on
the ‘city’ and interrogates not only the way in which we ‘care for’ migrants and their descen-
dants, but also the way in which we, with the help of our standards, facts and good inten-
tions, deny their essential right to maintain the obligations and requirements of their culture.11
In other words, Tobie Nathan is setting out a political problem.
There is nothing accidental or tangential about this. It comes from the living singularity
of our tradition that is eclipsed by the very plausible narrative we have inherited about the
disenchantment of the world. If there is a tradition that singularises us, it is, for me, that
called ‘politics’. The questions of knowing what the city is, who it belongs to, and what rights
and responsibilities are translated by this belonging, as well as the movements of struggle,
inventing new requirements, obligations and identities, are questions which singularise in
the first instance our history.
‘Rationality’ itself is in part linked with this political invention, because it was produced
first of all as a power of the contestation and transformation of relations of authority and
of once dominant modes of legitimation. Today rationality is not detached from them: it does
not constitute an instance of neutral consensus, overhanging conflicts and forceful relations,
but it is an ingredient that itself changes meaning, according to whether it is aligned with
the powers that maintain and reproduce the categories through which we define the city, or
with the social movements that interrogate and destabilise the obviousness of these categories.
I do not have the intention of transforming this text into a political dissertation, so I will
limit myself to affirming quite simply that the connection of rationality with disenchantment
places the one who utters this statement, whatever his intentions, on the side of the con-
querors in our history, those who have known how to capture and suppress their powers
of transformation. In a correlative fashion, the practical challenge of inventing for medicine
other paths than the Royal Road, which ‘weld the symptom to the person’, place the one who
formerly the UTS review
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utters this statement on the side of political invention, which is to say the singular mode
according to which, in our culture, minorities invent things and invent themselves.
In our history, the ‘fools’ the ‘beggars’ or the sans culottes maybe even be the slaves recog-
nising themselves through the Christian god, were able to invent themselves via the adjec-
tive that disqualified them. But isn’t this also what is happening now, in the field of medicine,
with the so-called ‘junkies’ who accumulate erudite dissertations on the legitimacy of this
adjective to reclaim themselves as such in ‘non-reforming’ users associations (the Dutch bap-
tised themselves ‘junkie’ in the act of creating the junkiebonden)? I know organisations of
users are not easy things for the medical profession to talk to, because they demand help
while refusing to pay the expected price, and they demand that their submission to medical
categories be recognised, while refusing to allow themselves to be ‘welded to their symptom’.
For myself, I consider them to be the ones, like organised victims of AIDS trying to get their
rights and claims upheld, who are the vectors, no doubt stuttering and sometimes incoherent,
of the tradition that singularises us, the one that we can call ourselves the inheritors of. And
this heritage includes those preoccupied with rationality as much as those preoccupied with
justice, because the ‘junkies’ who invent themselves as part and parcel of the city, and not as
objects of medical and police definition, create in doing this, for us all, citizens, doctors and
experts, the constraints and the risks on the basis of which we will be able to work out a dis-
course on drug use that will in the end be ‘rational’.12
My conclusion, even if it seems paradoxical, was perfectly predictable. It was predictable
in so far as ‘psychiatry’ and ‘medicine’ are concerned, here as everywhere else, with insepar-
able problems about what makes collectives work. Their practical identities depend quite
obviously on the way they accept this inseparability, or define it as an obstacle to a profes-
sional practice finally getting respectable. And yet, this conclusion is no recipe, ‘order word’
or denunciation. It does not finger the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’, the ‘unfortunate alienated sick’
and the ‘repressive institutions’, as if it might be sufficient to throw the latter into question
so that the former wake up by some miracle to the possibility of redefining all by themselves
what in the exterior world was qualifying them. This conclusion has in mind, above all,
the images that can make inroads into the dynamics of invention happening now or in the
future: first the image that opposes rationality and politics; then the one that would lead a
doctor in good faith to favourably consider the self-help movements for drug users or victims
of AIDS, merging them for instance with Narcotics Anonymous groups (‘associations very
useful to keep up the spirits of those involved’); and finally that which would lead to their
merging with associations for sick people ‘sticking in a group according to their symptom’,
which proliferate mostly in the USA. My conclusion aims to propose that the doctor recog-
nise these movements as having vital interest for the future of medicine.
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Allow me to recall, in conclusion, that this future poses, in all likelihood, a political
problem. Today medicine cannot be reduced to the response to individual suffering because
this is not just the business of the doctor and his patient. It has become one of the great
vectors of human history itself, one of the sites where it is decided in what way human beings
construct both their individual and collective identities. I will simply remind us that it would
not be impossible for our descendants in the quite near future to find themselves in a posi-
tion where they, along with their relatives, and under pain of social opprobrium, are classi-
fied into ‘risk groups’, and constrained to submit from an early age to procedures that will
bring about, in a ‘responsible’ present, a statistical probability that today appears still to even-
tuate. Insurance companies, employment procedures, techniques for procreation, the
right to health care—all these things in one way or another are going to be redefined on
the basis of technical developments for which the sole purpose at the beginning was for
the relief of individual suffering. Beyond the legal and regulatory problems, what is at
stake is the way in which humans hope, anticipate, fear and imagine, the way in which they
not only conceive but also construct their own identities. Because of course, societies
today make all this up just as much as so-called traditional societies. The only difference,
and it is a weighty one, is that now they refuse, on this point, to think about what they
are doing.13
Of course it is not the doctors’ job to decide this future. But the terms in which the
question of this future are put depends nevertheless on the way in which they are situated.
The dominant position today is that it is certainly a question which medicine puts to society,
but that doctors should stick to being modest representatives of a rationality and a vocation
that orders them to do what they have to do, which is to say, demand, wait for, or submit
to the rules and regulations decided by ‘the politicians’. Everyone knows that the situation
is not one of such luminous simplicity, but the guiding word is nonetheless one of avoiding
thinking too much about what will throw into question the categories of the medical act in
the city, which is to say, avoiding thinking.
I began with defining modern medicine against the charlatan, and I have arrived at the
question of medicine in the city. What sleight of hand was this? One can certainly stress,
from the beginning, that the two questions are associated. To return one last time to the tub,
the question that preoccupied the commissioners was political as well as scientific. It is true
Mesmer was disturbing not only the medical order, but also the order of the city, because
many of those assembled around the fluid constituted the active symbol of equality among
men: the King, as much as his most lowly valet, it was said, could be effected by the fluid,
as the ‘magnetic relationship’ united all humans and affirmed their fundamental equality.
But the movement of my argument claims a more profound meaning, which harks back to
the political singularity of our tradition. The question of the rationality of medicine does not
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belong to the unique landscape of the practices that reference modern science, and nor is
it a question of the ‘epistemological’ type. We, citizens and doctors, are engaged in a tradition
that invented rationality as a gage, as a discriminating reference for the futures that we are
constructing. For us it is a vector of obligations and requirements, which, for good or ill,
constructs us and forces us to think. In this way, we are inscribed in a redoubtable tradition.
Here where neutral masks of objectivity, good intentions or professional seriousness justify
a halt to thought, there where the light cast by our streetlamps actively keeps in the shadows
the things that stand in our way, this tradition makes those who refer to it into devotees, and
authorises itself to make them accomplices to a blind history, which is to say a criminal one.
That is why the ‘practical challenge’ of a medicine capable of becoming worthy of what it
is dealing with cannot be understood as a simple local stake, according to whatever defini-
tion the drift of history gives to it, whatever practice wants to call itself modern. To become
capable of hearing this challenge is also to become capable of recognising what makes it,
whether taken up or ignored, a crucial element of our future.
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